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Introduction
Governance has emerged rapidly as a term to describe both the multi-faceted
nature and structure of the modern decision-making process (Rhodes 1997; Pierre and
Peters 2000; Kooiman 2003). However, as the literature on the concept expands, so
too has the necessity to develop in tandem our understanding of accountability as a
core element in modern governing arrangements (Papadopoulos 2003). Indeed,
modern governance would appear to be ‘accountable’ governance, such has been the
emphasis on creating multiple accountability relationships in contemporary politics
and public administration. In particular, the challenges posed to traditional governing
and accountability relationships by new institutional and regulatory frameworks
require considerable analysis. After all, democratic accountability cannot function
successfully unless it is clear to all within the polity who is accountable for what and
to whom.
Parliamentary accountability is central to the successful functioning of the
democratic system yet has received remarkably little attention in Irish academic
literature. This is in contrast to the significant literature that has emerged on the issue
of parliamentary accountability in other Westminster-type legislatures such as Britain
and Australia, following high-profile cases of political corruption and malpractice. In
brief, it refers to the obligation of the executive to reveal and defend its decisions
(both ex-ante and ex-post) to the elected representatives of the people. Key to this
process is the need for those representatives to have adequate tools at their disposal to
uncover and interpret the activities of the executive. However, as is the case in most
European legislatures, the reality of party politics has blunted the effectiveness of
such tools. In Ireland, the failure of mechanisms of parliamentary accountability has
resulted in a period of tumultuous change, including the creation of a new
accountability superstructure for both political and administrative activities
(MacCarthaigh 2005).
The proliferation of new regulatory and oversight institutions is one of the
most striking features of contemporary Irish governance, and coincides with a
breakdown of traditional structures and hierarchies in both public and private spheres.
In many areas of Irish public policy making, from electronic communications to2
asylum seeking, aviation to consumer affairs, there is a discernible trend towards the
establishment of institutions in response to a particular policy or political or crises.
Indeed, a common justification for establishing many of these new institutions is that
they ensure greater ‘accountability’ and increase the quantity of information available
concerning activity in their respective policy field. However, the ever-increasing
complexity of accountability relationships, combined with an emphasis on consulation
and network governance as a method of problem solving, arguably creates as many
difficulties as it tries to solve.
This is particularly evident in the creation of new institutions to be examined
here. These are entities established to monitor and regulate the activities of political
actors and provide more information concerning the policy-making process. In this
chapter, it is proposed that not only do the Standards in Public Office Commission
and the Office of the Freedom of Information Commissioner respectively bypass the
constitutional forum for political and administrative accountability – Dáil Éireann –
but their experiences to date draw attention to the paradoxes of multiple
accountability relationships. In particular, it is argued here that ever-increasing
demands for direct public access to information can potentially lead to a less effective
accountability regime.
Governance and Accountability in Ireland
Accountability has emerged as one of the most ubiquitous concepts in
contemporary Irish political discourse. It seems that whatever the institution, there
can never be too much accountability; and lack of accountability is frequently
identified as the root of institutional inadequacy. However, as accountability is
increasingly used in a variety of environments and situations, so too has its meaning
been widened. Also, there is a significant emphasis on institutions rather than
behaviour in the examination of accountability in a European context. As Mulgan
argues, the proliferation in the use of the term has coincided with the growth in
literature on governance, and from its roots in administrative law, accountability now
encompasses issues of control, responsiveness, responsibility, audit, liability and
blameworthiness (Mulgan, 2000, 2003). Many contemporary conceptions and models
of accountability have emerged from organisational theory and the structure of3
accountability regimes (particularly reporting mechanisms) also forms a large part of
contemporary literature on corporate governance (Bovens 1998: 50-1; Procter &
Miles 2003; Sternberg 2004).
Traditionally understood, accountability implied a set of agreed rules between
actors, in which an external principal reserves the power to sanction an agent for
failing to act in the principal’s interest. Indeed, the much vaunted principal-agent
model has been used to describe the theoretical nature of accountable government,
with citizens as the ultimate principals (Strøm 2000). As deLeon argues, this
distinguishes it from the concept of responsibility which referred to internal controls
inspired by professional or personal ethics (deLeon, 2003). Chains of accountability
are traditionally viewed as hierarchical and only ever as strong as the weakest link in
them. However, accountability relationships today encompass a much wider variety
of interpretations, and are frequently understood by reference to contrasting
dichotomies e.g. political versus administrative accountability, internal versus
external accountability, and centralised and devolved accountability (Thomas, 2003).
The difficulty with this expansion in interpretation is that the more relationships that
accountability is meant to define, the less it actually represents.
Indeed, the catchphrase of increasing the ‘openness, transparency and
accountability’ of public bodies and decisions has become a legitimating factor in
much of public sector reform in Ireland since the early 1990s. For example, the
Strategic Management Initiative, launched in 1994, envisages that the Irish public
administration would become more directly accountability to the public as consumers
of its services. As with New Public Management style reforms elsewhere, there is an
emphasis in Ireland on improving public sector performance through formal structures
of accountability that make direct links with the public, thus addressing the much
maligned impersonal and ‘one-size-fits-all’ nature of traditional bureaucracy.
Accountability has also been a prominent feature of the development of the State’s
involvement with the private sector in the delivery of large infrastructure projects
(particularly Public-Private Partnerships) and the outsourcing of specialist functions
to consultancies. However, the concern with accountability has not rested solely in
the administrative sphere. As a result of several corruption scandals and the
subsequent desire of governments to be seen as responsive to public concerns, the4
accountability of political parties and actors has never been subject to as much
scrutiny as it has been in the last number of years. This has been made possible
through the introduction of new legislation and institutions designed to regulate the
activities of political actors and public access to information concerning the decision-
making process, as will be discussed below.
The introduction of new institutions designed to deliver better accountability is
based on the premise that more accountability is in fact better accountability.
However, the contrary is often true. As with many issues concerning institutional
design, unintended consequences are common and may produce a result which is the
opposite of that desired. For example, Dubnick argues that the greater the use of
administrative accountability mechanisms in a bureaucracy, the less bureaucrats will
behave responsibly, ethically and professionally (Dubnick, 2003). Behn also notes
this ‘accountability dilemma’ (or paradox) faced by those involved in devising and
implementing policy (Behn, 2001).
Though subject to considerable criticism, parliamentary accountability is the
most fundamental element of government in democratic (parliamentary) polities. As
the only directly elected public institution in most democracies, parliaments are tasked
with ensuring that optimal standards of political and administrative accountability are
consistently achieved. The growth of the ‘executive state’ in recent years has made
this role increasingly difficult to realise in most Western states, and has resulted in
internal innovations such as committee systems. As demonstrated below, how a
parliament functions is significantly dependent on the institutional environment in
which it is manifested. Unlike many new accountability arrangements affecting
modern governance processes, from financial compliance to professional codes of
conduct, parliamentary accountability is at the heart of democratic governance in
many Western democracies. In theory, it involves the subjection of the executive to
scrutiny by the representatives of the governed, with the ultimate threat of sanction
and dismissal. In this respect, parliamentary accountability involves substantial
transfers of information, and requires string elements of trust and honesty in order to
maximise its effectiveness5
While its effectiveness in Ireland has been undermined through a combination
of adversarial parliamentary politics and domination by the executive of the
parliamentary agenda, parliamentary accountability is fundamentally challenged by
the emergence of alternative sources of executive oversight (MacCarthaigh 2005: 52-
93). Indeed, a key development in Irish and other Westminster-style parliamentary
politics in recent years has been the attempt to move away from the traditional chains
of accountability – exemplified by the doctrine of ministerial responsibility – to more
direct forms of scrutiny (Flinders 2001). An example of this in Ireland is the power
granted to parliamentary committees to question public servants or the boards of state
agencies directly, made possible by the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas
(Compellability, Privileges and Immunities) Act, 1997. These shifting accountability
relationships reflect the changing institutional relationships which characterise the
shift elsewhere described as a move from government to governance.
Parliamentary accountability is also challenged by the NPM-inspired reform
of the Irish public administration. Despite the increased resources available to the
Irish legislature to engage in its oversight function
1, and the embeddedness of the
parliamentary committee system, scrutinising the activities of an increasingly
complex and growing public service is not possible. In particular, the explosion of
non-departmental bodies or agencies
2 at local and national level, and the varying
degrees of autonomy which accompany their functions presents accountability
challenges for parliament (McGauran et al 2005, Clancy and Murphy 2006). So too
does the increased focus on the separation of policy from implementation activities
within Ministries.
Table 1 below adapted from MacCarthaigh (2005: 23) describes the
development of supplementary mechanisms of accountability alongside existing
mechanisms in both parliamentary and non-parliamentary or ‘public’ arenas.
1 In 2004, the Houses of the Oireachtas assumed control of their own budget for the Department of
Finance. Monies are now paid over in three-year envelopes and it is largely at the discretion of the
Houses as to how that money is to be spent.
2 Defined by Pollitt et al. (2001: 271) as ‘an organisation that stands at arms length from its parent
ministry or ministries and carries out public functions’6
Table 1: Parliamentary, judicial and public mechanisms of accountability





























































* While the Ombudsman and Freedom of Information Commissioner are appointed by the Houses of
the Oireachtas and present reports to both Houses, they are in fact independent of those Houses and not
accountable to them.7
This chapter uses the case studies of the Standards in Public Office
Commission and the Office of the Freedom of Information Commissioner to
demonstrate the difficulties of foisting new accountability mechanisms on existing
arrangements. The creation of both offices followed considerable criticism levelled at
the decision-making process in light of sustained revelations of political corruption
and administrative malpractice during the 1990s, a period of considerable economic
and social transformation in Ireland. In this chapter, it is proposed that while these
new institutions provide for considerably more information on the activities of the
political and administrative spheres in Ireland, they do so at the expense of traditional
parliamentary mechanisms of executive oversight. While the ineffectiveness of these
parliamentary mechanisms may have been a significant contributory factor to the
necessity for new modes of executive oversight, it is proposed that creating multiple
accountability relationships may not achieve better or more accountable forms of
governance.
The Standards in Public Office Commission
The first institution we wish to consider is the Standards in Public Office
Commission. Its origins lie in the 1995 Ethics in Public Office Act, which updated
the law on the prevention of corruption and provided for the annual registration of
interests by people in key public positions. These include parliamentarians and
members of the Cabinet, senior civil and public servants, state agency board members
and senior executives of commercial state enterprises, as well as special advisers to
ministers. Reflecting the fact that the parliamentary committee system was not fully
embedded by this stage, committee chairmen were not specified under the Act. It did
oblige members of the Oireachtas, when speaking or voting on an issue, to make a
formal declaration if the issue involves a potential conflict of interest; as well as to
provide a written account of their interests to the Clerk of either House. The veracity
of these statements of interest is not in fact checked by any of the staff of the Houses
and the only incentive for members to declare their assets is the potential negative
publicity for not doing so.8
The Act also provided for the establishment of a Public Offices Commission,
whose role was to monitor compliance with the provisions of the Act by the public
office holders mentioned above. Its members were the Ceann Comhairle (Speaker) of
Dáil Éireann, the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Ombudsman, and the Clerks
of Dáil and Seanad Éireann. Following recommendations made by the final report of
a Tribunal of Inquiry
3, the Ethics in Public Offices Act was amended by the Standards
in Public Office Act, 2001. The most notable feature of the new Act was the creation
of the Standards in Public Office Commission, which replaced the Public Offices
Commission. The Standards in Public Office Commission did not include in its
membership the Ceann Comhairle. Instead, he or she was to be replaced by a member
of the judiciary appointed by the President on the advice of the government, and who
would fulfil the role of Chairperson. The new legislation also allows the Commission
to appoint another member of its choosing, and it appointed a former minister to that
position.
The Commission is principally concerned with attempting to provide a level
playing field in the political process by regulating and monitoring the financial
activities of the political parties. The remit of the Commission extends from the
Electoral Acts 1997 to 2002, and the Oireachtas (Ministerial and Parliamentary
Offices) (Amendment) Act, 2001. These Acts give the Commission the power to
monitor the disclosure of political donations, the limiting of election expenditure,
public funding of qualified political parties, as well as the reimbursement of expenses
incurred by certain election candidates.
The Commission’s work in disclosing the levels of expenditure by the political
parties during elections and the identification of those private interests who donate
money to the party has been significant. Its very existence undoubtedly deters
potential corruption of the electoral processes, and introduces a culture of financial
accountability which was previously absent from the political process. Since its
enactment, the focus of the standards in public office legislation has broadened
considerably. It has advanced from a position where disclosure of interests and
reporting of possible conflicts of interest were the principal features, to a more
3 The 1997 Dunnes Payments Tribunal, better known as the McCracken Tribunal after its chairman,
Brian McCracken9
prescriptive mode which includes certification of tax clearance for public service
appointees or adherence to codes of conduct.
Members of the Oireachtas who are not office holders as defined under the
Acts are responsible to the Committees on Members' Interests of the Dáil or Seanad.
The Ethics in Public Office Act (and later Standards in Public Office Act) established
these committees to monitor the implementation of their recommendations, as well as
to sanction members who broke the guidelines established by the legislation. This
was a considerable development as it introduced a new mechanism of oversight within
the Oireachtas and empowered its members to make decisions concerning their peers.
However, as will be detailed below, the committees have encountered several
difficulties in fulfilling their remit.
Also, members of the Oireachtas must now provide a statement of registerable
interests each year. The completed Register of Interests is then laid before the
Houses. Oireachtas members who are members of the government must also provide
an annual statement of additional interests (i.e. relevant family interests). In addition,
in certain circumstances they must provide a statement of material interest when
debating or voting on a matter.
The Commission also has a function in respect of the bureaucracy, insofar as
elected members may make complaints against public servants to it. This is an
important development, as it allows parliamentarians to circumvent a key element of
ministerial responsibility which designated the appropriate Minister to be
‘responsible’ for the activities of civil servants. Thus the Commission offers another
alternative to Dáil Éireann in terms of administrative oversight.
Freedom of Information Act and the Office of the Information
Commissioner
While the Standards in Public Office Commission has introduced a new
element of regulation and accountability to the political process, it has been matched
by an initiative to provide for direct public access to the decision-making process.10
The Freedom of Information Act was introduced in 1997 and initially applied to
central government and related departments. However, the range of public bodies
under its remit has grown substantially since then. The Act provided for extensive
powers of disclosure to the public of documentation which previously would not be
released until a period of thirty years had elapsed under the 1986 National Archives
Act. This new legislation drew on best practice from other Westminster-style
democracies including Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and was created to allow
citizens have rights of access to information held by public bodies as of April 1998.
There is no Freedom of Information Act in Britain, although the Labour party has
advocated the creation of one since 1974 (Flinders: 312). At the same time Ireland’s
Freedom of Information legislation had to ensure citizens’ rights of privacy and to
ensure that fair procedures were followed. The legislation provided for the
establishment of an Information Commissioner and this role was subsequently given
to the Ombudsman.
The Information Commissioner was presented with substantial powers under
the Act, such as the ability to authorise the release of information that may previously
have been withheld in response to a citizen’s request. In brief, the legislation created
three new statutory rights:
 A legal right for each person to access information held by public bodies
 A legal right for each person to have official information relating to
him/herself amended where it is incomplete, incorrect or misleading
 A legal right to obtain reasons for decisions affecting oneself.
The Information Commissioner derives his or her legitimacy from the fact that
their appointment is made by the President on the advice of the government following
a resolution of both Houses of the Oireachtas. The decision to make the Ombudsman
also hold the Office of the Information Commissioner was made on the basis that the
Ombudsman’s office had considerable expertise in the area of disclosure of public
records. Indeed, the Ombudsman/Information Commissioners offices share their
premises with the Standards in Public Office Commission.11
Combined, the Standards in Public Office and Freedom of Information
legislation have significantly increased the volume of material available on the
administrative and political processes in Ireland. They also offer an alternative to the
traditional source of information on the work of the bureaucracy which allowed
Ministers to act as veto players on the release of such information. However, whether
or not the new institutions introduce more accountability to the decision-making
process is a different matter.
The Standards in Public Office Commission and Office of the Information
Commissioner are manifestations of the institutional response to concerns with ethics
and accountability in public life. However, while they deal with the symptoms of
accountability deficits including corrupt payments and poor administrative
procedures, it may be argued that they do not address its root cause i.e. the failure of
existing mechanisms of oversight. It is necessary here to consider the inadequate
ability to pursue political and administrative accountability within the principal
oversight forum in the state - Dáil Éireann.
Why is parliamentary accountability weak?
In modern Westminster-style parliamentary democracies, the principal feature
is the power-hungry nature of the executive, and its accumulation of influence at the
expense of the legislature which elects it. The Lower House of the Irish parliament,
Dáil Éireann, displays a particularly strong example of this dynamic, and, more so
that even Westminster itself, the government controls the parliamentary agenda with
ease (Döring 2004: 149; Gallagher 2005). Indeed, the executive maintains a
practically unassailable veto over the various parliamentary procedures, such as the
legislative process, the voting of monies and the format of debates, and is easily able
to insulate itself from opposition scrutiny. However, as originally conceived, Dáil
Éireann was designed to allow for opposition party input into the work of the
executive, and the parliamentary accountability of the executive was expected to be
upheld through various innovative mechanisms. For example there was provision for
‘extern Ministers’ in the Cabinet who would be accountable to the chamber rather
than the government. However, by the 1960s the House had evolved into one that had
a significantly diminished role in the policy process. Why this has occurred is due to12
a combination of the dynamics of the party system, and the standing orders or rules of
the House.
The use of a proportional electoral system in post-independence Ireland was
expected to return coalition governments. However, by the 1930’s PR-STV was
consistently returning two large political blocs more typical of majoritarian electoral
systems. On one side, the populist Fianna Fáil refused to form anything other than
single party governments when the opportunity arose, thus forcing the two principal
opposition parties, Fine Gael and the Labour Party, into unlikely coalitions at different
periods. From 1932 until 1989, therefore, Irish politics revolved around a ‘Fianna
Fáil versus the rest’ adversarial dynamic which encouraged the government of the day
to exclude the opposition parties from the decision-making process within the
legislative arena.
In a Westminster-style parliament, the party or parties in power have little
incentive to grant the opposition parties opportunities to investigate their activities.
For the opposition, the most productive course of action is to attack the government at
any given opportunity and to criticise their lack of input into the decision-making
process. However, when in power, that same opposition will find it prudent to
insulate itself from scrutiny. This pattern of behaviour characterises the traditional
nature of Irish parliamentary politics, but the advent of coalition government since
1989 has presented increased opportunities for the non-government parties to inquire
into government activity.
A good example of this development was the first coalition between Fianna
Fáil and the Labour Party in 1992. As part of the agreement, the government
established a comprehensive set of departmentally aligned committees, which allowed
backbenchers on both sides of the House to engage more constructively in the policy
process (O’Halpin 1997). The committees allowed Dáil Éireann to increase its
economy of operation, by facilitating parallel debate over legislation and increased
oversight of the public administration. However, the committees’ composition
reflected that of the plenary and did not allow the opposition members to successfully
challenge the prerogative of the executive, a point returned to below.13
The coalition governments that have existed since 1989 have contributed to a
certain ‘opening-up’ of government insofar as there has been a strong emphasis on
achieving greater public access to information concerning all public institutions.
While a detailed examination of this phenomenon is not possible here, there would
appear to be a strong relationship between the existence of multiple veto players
within the executive and the use of extra-parliamentary mechanisms of oversight.
Such a development is unlikely to have occurred under a situation of single-party
government, where the incumbent party is not inclined to impose obstacles to its
agenda-setting capacity. All Tribunals of Inquiry investigating issues of political and
administrative malpractice (below) have occurred during the period of successive
coalition governments beginning in 1989. Similarly, the Electoral Act which
established state funding for political parties (as well as spending and donation limits
for them) and the Freedom of Information Act, were both promulgated by the same
three-party coalition government in 1997. This was the 1994-7 ‘Rainbow Coalition’
government which consisted of the centre-right Fine Gael party, the social democratic
Labour Party, and the socialist Democratic Left party.
The other principal factor in explaining the weakness of parliamentary
oversight is the configuration of the rules governing the behaviour of the
parliamentary parties. In every democracy, the legislature will operate by a set of
procedures which determine the entitlements of government and non-government
representatives to the most valuable legislative commodity – parliamentary time.
Without parliamentary time, questions cannot be asked, debates cannot proceed and
governments cannot be held to account. In Dáil Éireann, the existing 171 ‘Standing
Orders relative to Public Business’ provide distinct advantages to the government in
its control of the agenda. For example, the time allotted to the opposition to control
the floor of the Chamber is minimal, at only 6 hours per week, and there is virtually
no chance of non-government legislation progressing being approved without
government permission. There have been many amendments to the standing orders
since the early 1920s but the principal dynamic has been one of ensuring efficiency
for executive business rather than effective oversight of that work.
This combination of adversarial parliamentary politics and rules that protected
the ability of the executive to dominate the House inhibits the effectiveness of the14
traditional mechanisms of parliamentary oversight, including parliamentary debate,
questions and more recently the committee system. While at first glance there appear
to be a multitude of avenues available to members to hold the executive to account in
respect of both political and administrative matters, closer examination reveals that
this is not necessarily true. The standing orders ensure that invariably, the executive
is able to use its parliamentary majority to limit the effectiveness of these
mechanisms.
MacCarthaigh (2005) examines the difficulties faced by non-government
members in pursuing executive accountability in the legislature. However, while the
ineffectiveness of these mechanisms of oversight had long been identified and
criticised, events in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought them into sharp relief.
The inability of parliament to adequately deal with allegations of maladministration
and political corruption resulted in a watershed for the concept of accountability in
Irish governance. From this period forward, a process emerged of resorting to extra-
parliamentary mechanisms of oversight to deal with issues concerning the political
and administrative realms, and this dynamic has had a significant influence of the
shape of modern Irish governance.
Tribunals of Inquiry
Prior to 1991, Tribunals of Inquiry were concerned with specific incidents
such as a fire disaster or particular economic issue. Post 1991, Tribunals are
concerned with governance issues, and particularly matters concerning administrative
failure and abuse of public office. In most cases, the Tribunals were created when
parliamentary mechanisms of accountability failed or were not able to deal with the
issues under question. Indeed, the subtext to many Tribunals of Inquiry is that the
matters before them were raised at parliamentary level, but the oversight mechanisms
detailed above were incapable of providing for a satisfactory resolution to the issues
which were exposed.15
In many respects, the first Tribunal of the era under consideration, the Beef
Tribunal
4, encapsulates two principal issues which were to feature in subsequent
Tribunals. Firstly, there was concern about the conduct of those in public office, and
particularly with respect to the clientelist networks between Ministers and prominent
business figures, which were not subject to external accountability. Secondly, there
was a concern with the structures of accountability within elements of the
administrative system.
As well as suspicion of improper practices within the Beef Industry which
were not dealt with by the Department of Agriculture, the Tribunal was concerned
with allegations that ministers had not provided proper answers to parliamentary
questions. These questions concerned issues which were later exposed by
investigative reporters. During the late 1980s, opposition members had raised
questions concerning the awarding of export insurance cover to one company chaired
by an individual with close personal ties to government members. However, the
answers to the questions were evasive and the questioning member had no recourse to
mechanisms which would provide more satisfaction. Indeed, during the course of the
Beef Tribunal’s work, the chairman noted that,
I think that if the questions that were asked in the Dáil were answered
in the way they are answered here, there would be no necessity for this
inquiry and an awful lot of money and time would have been saved.
(Cited in O’Toole 1995: 241).
The Beef Tribunal led directly to the promulgation of the Ethics in Public
Office Act (above). However, the Beef Tribunal report did not deal with the issue of
how members of parliament did not appear to respect the oversight role of the
Oireachtas. This issue was returned to in a subsequent Tribunal of Inquiry – the
McCracken Tribunal. It was established in 1997 and was concerned with the issue of
financial payments by a prominent businessman to senior politicians from the three
main political parties. While it did not propose changes to the mechanisms of
parliamentary accountability outlined above, it did note that false declarations of
4 The official title for this inquiry was the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Beef
Processing Industry.16
interest by members of parliament should be considered a criminal offence
(McCracken 1997: 75).
The report of this Tribunal resulted in the establishment of a further Tribunal
of Inquiry – Moriarty – in 1997. This Tribunal is ongoing at time of writing and is
inquiring into the financial affairs of two senior political figures from the two main
political parties. Its establishment coincided with the creation of the Flood Tribunal
to investigate allegations of corruption in the planning process, and specifically that
certain public figures were bribed by property developers. The Flood Tribunal has
been of particular significance as its second interim report (released in 2002)
identified certain payments to politicians as ‘corrupt’, the first time the term had been
used in any Tribunal. Indeed, a former Minister who received corrupt payments
denied that he had done so to the Dáil in 1997, again demonstrating the ease with
which member mislead the chamber without fear of sanction. The work of the
Moriarty and Flood Tribunals acted as catalysts for anti-corruption legislation, as well
as the Standards in Public Office Act in 2001.
With regard to issues concerning the public administration, Tribunals have
also been instrumental in identifying considerable lapses in accountability within state
agencies and government departments. The Lindsay and Finlay Tribunals uncovered
significant lacunae in the Department of Health in respect of blood products.
Furthermore, at time of writing, the Barr and Morris Tribunals are investigating the
activities of the Garda Síochána – an arm of the State that is legally accountable to the
Minister for Justice. As these inquiries proceed, the government has decided to
introduce a new Garda inspectorate to oversee the work of the force and its senior
officers. Furthermore, the reports of the Beef and Finlay Tribunals contributed to and
coincided with the processing of the Freedom of Information Act through parliament.
It is clear, therefore, that the deficiencies in the political and administrative
realms uncovered and investigated by the Tribunals of Inquiry contributed to the
impetus for the establishment of several new regulatory and oversight institutions
5.
5 This is mirrored by events in Britain where a series in public scandals and concern over standards in
ethics in public office resulted in the establishment in 1994 of the Committee on Standards in Public
Life under the Chairmanship of Lord Nolan. Since then, the committee has published several wide-17
While each Tribunal involves a unique set of events and personalities, the issues of
political and administrative oversight are common to almost all of them. However,
the political pressure to be seen to react to these public scandals has resulted in these
lengthy and expensive quasi-judicial inquiries becoming part of the contemporary
Irish political landscape. In the process, it is forgotten that political and
administrative oversight is one of the principal functions of parliament, and
employing alternative institutions inevitably serves to reduce the efficacy of
parliamentary accountability.
What are the difficulties with the new institutions?
As we have seen, the Offices of the Freedom of Information Commissioner
and the Standards in Public Office Commission are comparatively new institutions.
While some of the difficulties they have encountered in fulfilling their remit may be
considered as ‘teething’ difficulties, others point to a fundamental dilemma with
attempting to regulate either the political process or the activities of political actors
6.
As with so much of institutional reform, there have been unintended consequences
which have served to undermine the intentions of the institutions themselves.
Difficulties with SIPO
In June 2003, the Commission released details of spending by candidates
during the 2002 general election, the first to be held during the Commission’s short
existence. It found that 56 of the incoming 166 TDs had overspent their quota as
established under the Electoral (Amendment) Act, 2001, amongst them the Taoiseach
and indeed most of the Cabinet. Some of this overspending was the result of a court
decision on the eve of the election, which held that Oireachtas members must count in
their spending estimation services such as mail and secretarial services. Bye-elections
in two constituencies during 2004 also exposed flaws in the remit of the SIPO’s work.
The money spent by candidates in parliamentary elections is only counted from the
time that such an election is called. However, there is nothing to prohibit parties
spending money on canvassing in advance of this date and what money is spent need
ranging reports concerning issues such as ethics in the public service, party financing and the
accountability of non-departmental public bodies.
6 See also the discussion concerning these issues in the final report of the democratic audit of Ireland
being undertaken by the think-tank TASC, 2007.18
not be included in the final figures submitted to the SIPO. Also, the Commission has
no practical method of taking into account the activities of party activists and the
value of their efforts. While political actors are technically adhering to the
requirement of the legislation, the practice post-enactment would appear to be to find
ways to work around its stipulations.
The 2003 Annual report also noted a high level of technical contraventions of
the Act, particularly in relation to tax clearance certificates, but noted that this was not
a significant issue. Also, it noted the Commission’s concern that the Minister for
Finance had not updated the list of public bodies which should fall under the remit of
its work (Standards in Public Office Commission Annual Report 2003 (Dublin:
Standards in Public Office Commission, 2004, p.11, 16). More important was the
inability of the Commission to censure a deputy who had returned a false tax
clearance certificate. The Commission noted that the legislation governing its work
required that for it to take action, a complaint must be made against a TD and as none
had been made, it had been left with no option but to refer the matter on to the Dáil
Committee on Members’ Interests (below) but it did not take any action and referred
the matter back to the Commission. However, by this stage the time limit within
which the Commission could take action had been reached and it could not therefore
pursue the matter further itself.
Also, an incident in 2004 occurred where a conflict of interest was suspected
in the case of a Minister awarding a public relations contract to a consultant with
whom he had a close political relationship. The matter was deemed serious enough
for the Taoiseach to remove from ministers the power to directly employ public
relations consultants. Despite the fact that the issue appeared to be one for which the
Commission was created to investigate, its annual report brushed over the matter,
arguing that:
The evidence before the Standards Commission did not establish a
prima facie case which would have warranted an investigation within
the terms of the legislation in question. In that regard, the grounds for
possible investigation by the Standards Commission could not extend
beyond the scope of the relevant legislation. Standards in Public Office19
Commission Annual Report 2004 (Dublin: Standards in Public Office
Commission, 2005, p.16).
However, there are more fundamental problems with the Commission’s
attempts to regulate the activities of political actors. In order to support the work of
the Commission within the Oireachtas, the 1995 and 2001 Acts both provided for the
creation of Committees on Members’ Interests in both Houses. In fact, the Dáil
Committee on Members’ Interests is the only select committee of that chamber with a
non-government majority. The chair was, however, held by a member of the
government. Neither committee has the power to alter, revise or otherwise change the
findings of the Standards in Public Office Commission. The principal role of the
committee is to implement the Standards in Public Office legislation in respect of
those members of wither House who are not office-holders.
While the role of the committees is to provide support within the legislature
for the provisions of the Ethics Act, to date there have been difficulties recruiting
members to them. During the latter stages of the 1997-2002 government, the Dáil
Committee on Members’ Interests were asked to investigate the actions of two
members, Ned O’Keeffe and Denis Foley. In both cases, the issue before the
Committee was that the TD did not declare an interest during a debate. The
Committee’s recommended suspensions in both cases, but not before committee
members voiced their displeasure at the nature of their work. Indeed, in both cases
the issue of members’ mandate to represent his or her constituency and the democratic
dilemma of allowing members to remove their peers from the House deserve further
scrutiny.
Furthermore, the functions of the Standards in Public Office are not all
encompassing with respect to the activities of political actors. Indeed, one of the most
conspicuous aspects of the political-business interface is the work of political
lobbyists, and it remains the case that despite the revelations at the various Tribunals
concerning the activities of lobbyists – particularly the Flood Tribunal where former
Fianna Fáil press officer, Frank Dunlop, admitted bribing local councillors on behalf
of property developers – this sector remains unregulated. An unusual situation also
exists in the electoral expenditure legislation in that unlike for general, European and20
Presidential elections, there is no limit to how much a candidate may spend in local
elections. Oireachtas committee chairmen are also not included as named officers
Questions have also been raised over the accuracy of the Register of
Members’ Interests and allegations emerged during 2006 that members of the
Government had not declared substantial property portfolios in which they had an
interest. One of the members, a Minister of State, eventually resigned from his
portfolio.
Some of the problems encountered by the Standards in Public Office
Commission must be understood in the context of the fact that it is a new body
charged with an onerous task. Nonetheless, its work to date demonstrates the
difficulties of attempting to regulate political competition as well as the imposition of
new accountability arrangements onto an existing accountability structure in response
to a crisis. Indeed, there are likely to be further difficulties in demarcating the
jurisdiction of Dáil Éireann in censuring its members, and the work of the
Commission. The Commission has tried to expand its powers by asking in its 2004
annual report for the Government to allow it appoint an ‘inquiry officer’ which would
investigate issues initiated by the Commission itself. This request was rejected by the
Minister for Finance in July 2006 and the Commission therefore still relies on parties
external to it to request such action before it can so. The experience to date would
suggest that members are reluctant to complain about the colleagues.
Difficulties with Freedom of Information
The 1997 Freedom of Information Act was regarded as among the most
progressive of its type, and as representing a substantial step in the development of
public accountability in Ireland. A consultancy report on the Strategic Management
Iniative, which, as part of its remit, considered the progress of the Freedom of
Information Act found that it ‘…has generated additional workloads across
Departments/Offices, but it has undoubtedly improved the accountability of the civil
service to the wider public’ (PA Consulting 2002: 88). The Act was due for review
after five years in operation.21
Following their re-election in 2002, the Fianna Fáil / Progressive Democrat
government decided to amend it and established an ad-hoc committee of five senior
civil servants to consider revising certain clauses in the original Act. While the
government insisted that it was amending the Act in light of experience gained since
the introduction of the Act, more political reasons were suspected. These suspicions
were enhanced when it transpired that the executive did not directly consult the
Information Commissioner or users of the legislation such as academics or journalists,
over the proposed amendments. The amending legislation was rushed through both
Houses of the Oireachtas, causing great consternation in the media and opposition
benches.
The principal amendments to the Act included:
 Extension of the period after which public could access Government records
from 5 to 10 years
 Extension of the type and number of official documents to which the original
Act could not apply
 The non-application of the FOI Act to parliamentary briefing records,
including records created for the purpose of briefing in relation to the
answering of parliamentary questions
 The introduction of fees for all FOI requests
The amendments substantially extended the scope of records that fell under the
title of ‘Government papers’, and included sub-committees or other advisory bodies
which government could designate as ‘Government’. The amending Act significantly
curtailed the effectiveness of the original act, and was subject to considerable
criticism by the Information Commissioner and the Council of Europe. The Office
subsequently initiated an investigation into the operation of the Act in light of these
changes. The investigation looked both at the types of request now being made and at
the extent to which FOI is now being used. Its principal findings were:
 Overall usage of the Act had fallen by over 50% while requests for non-
personal information had declined by 75%.22
 The media are now less likely to use the Act and usage by journalists declined
steadily throughout 2003.
 Between the first quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of 2004 the number of
requests fell by 83% and still continues to decline.
 Other users of the Act, individuals and representative bodies, use the Act far
less than before to access information on decisions that affect them directly or
indirectly (Office of the Information Commissioner 2004).
As well as the curtailment of the remit of the office, however, there has been
some debate over whether or not there would less recording and documentation of
information by the civil service, particularly in its upper echelons, as a result of the
legislation. The Office of the Information Commissioners Annual Report for 2003
noted that ‘some in the public administration continue to view FOI with suspicion,
and hold genuine beliefs that that it can act as an impediment to good government’
(Office of the Information Commissioner 2004: 6). The report also noted that
statistics provided to the Office by public bodies regarding FOI usage ‘were not
always reliable’ and that this was related to the fact that there was no statutory
obligation on such bodies to compile such annual information.
In his memoir, former Government Press Officer Frank Dunlop noted the
tendency of civil servants to write their comments on ‘post-it’ notes which can be
removed from files if necessary (Dunlop 2004: 141). In a similar vein, a former
Government adviser turned Senator informed an Oireachtas Committee early in 2006
that because of FOI, he had ‘come across a situation where a top-level committee
which previously had minuted discussions and views of particular departments
changed its recording arrangement to simply setting out agreed conclusions’ (Wall,
2006). The Freedom of Information Commissioner also pointed out at the same
meeting that a recent report on clinical malpractice had recommended that the
Department of Health protect clinical governance records and risk-management
clinical incident reports from the application of the FOI Act. It was argued that
unless these documents were outside the scope of the Act, they were likely to be
created and opportunities for learning from mistakes would be lost (Wall, 2006).23
Naturally, the Office of the Information Commissioner has attempted to
demonstrate the benefits of full extension and implementation of the legislation. An
investigation by the Office into the progress of the new regulations found that the fear
of weak recording of decisions was unwarranted (Office of the Information
Commissioner 2001). Nonetheless, the report did express concern that the standard
of record-keeping was inadequate in some departments, and queried the subsequent
‘ability of public bodies to conduct their business efficiently’, noting that this ‘also
has implications for accountability’. At time of writing, the Freedom of Information
Act does not cover all sectors of the public service, and a common feature of the
annual reports of the Office of the Information Commissioner is for the office’s remit
to be extended. In July 2006, the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Finance and the
Public Service was asked to consider recommendations from the Information
Commissioner to allow almost 50 non-disclosure provisions to be subject to the
Freedom of Information Act. However, the government majority voted against the
proposals. It remains the case that many areas of the public service remain outside of
the remit of the Information Commissioner, including An Garda Síochána.
Competing Accountabilities
As contemporary Irish governance continues to broaden its network of
stakeholders and institutions, and further entwines market principles with those of the
public sector, so too does the meaning of accountability become more complex.
‘Government without boundaries’, ‘hollowed-out states’ and government ‘in the
shadow of hierarchy’ all require fundamental changes in how we understand the
accountability of the government to the governed. However, political expediency and
incremental change often characterise the nature of public sector institutional reform,
and little attention is paid to those core values which inform accountable governance.
As this chapter has demonstrated, events during the 1990s have resulted in
substantial institutional reconfiguration within the sphere of government. The
implications of these reforms of the core mechanisms of accountability – and
particularly democratic accountability – have yet to be more fully explored. The role
of the Oireachtas, and particularly Dáil Éireann in the midst of these changes is an24
uncertain one, yet the introduction of new extra-parliamentary accountability
mechanisms clearly have consequences for its work.
In terms of the issue of the accountability of political actors, both individually
and collectively, there is good reason to believe that personal ethics rather than formal
compliance and reporting requirements and financial audits can deliver a truly fair
political game. A culture of respect for parliament, so often a feature of feature of
ministerial resignations in Britain, can play a part in this development.
Parliamentarians must appreciate the symbolic import of activities that undermine
public faith in institutions of government. The Standards of Public Office
Commission, while it can play an important role in producing more information on
the activities of political actors, can only serve to supplement the ultimate
accountability of those same political actors to parliament.
Similarly, Freedom of Information legislation has certainly provided for
greater public access to information concerning the decision-making process. It has
also resulted in higher standards of record-keeping in those offices which are subject
to its stipulations. However, as Zimmerman points out, the legislation breaches the
‘corporation sole’ doctrine which places each minister as solely responsible for his or
her department (Zimmerman 2001: 79). Therefore, as with the Standards in Public
Office Commission, it challenges the existing parliamentary structures, and creates
more links in an increasingly diverse web of accountability relationships that
characterises modern Irish governance.
Like many concepts, accountability is often noted by its absence rather than its
presence. A perceived failure of parliamentary accountability has contributed to the
Irish state’s most significant period of institutional reform since independence,
including the establishment of an accountability regime that has expanded to a point
where it may be self-defeating. It is a curious feature of the changing relationship
between political parties and modern government that the democratic legitimacy of
new oversight bodies is often gauged with reference to their lack of political
personnel (Mair, 2006). Granting non-elected bodies the power to perform important
functions of accountable government does not necessarily increase the democratic
legitimacy of a governing system. Also, as noted above, more information does not25
mean more accountability and the role of established parliamentary accountability
mechanisms is worthy of more detailed consideration. As the only body charged with
providing for both political and administrative accountability, it may be time to bring
parliament ‘back in’ to our discussions of accountable governance.
Conclusion
As increasingly complex frameworks emerge to explain the institutional
development of the modern Irish state, there is a tendency to overlook the essential
role of those established institutions which shape the political and administrative
agenda. In particular, the role of the legislature and parliamentary accountability need
to be reconsidered in the context of competing accountability relationships. The
contention of this chapter is that many of the new oversight institutions tackle the
symptom and not the cause of both abuses in public office and poor administrative
practices within the bureaucracy.
A relentless pursuit for ever greater accountability is not without cost, and
more efficient ways of ensuring that agents are performing as principals desire are
constantly sought. In any event, no accountability mechanism is perfect, and issues of
trust and personal responsibility must also be factored in to any discussion of
accountable governance. Parliamentary accountability faces challenges from many
quarters other than new oversight institutions, including the demands resulting from
EU membership. The ultimate responsibility for accountability has to reside with
public institutions such as national parliaments and policy choices made by
governments must still be legitimised thorough conventional means (Peters & Pierre
2006: 216).
At the core of policy-making is the subjection of all executive decisions to
parliamentary accountability, yet the new networks and institutions of accountability
that have emerged create tensions within that practice. Indeed, it may be argued that
the role of Dáil Éireann in the public policy-making process has been undermined by
the recourse to extra-parliamentary mechanisms of oversight. While the House has
always been considered weak when compared with other legislatures, it remains the
only public institution with the legitimacy to hold the executive accountable.26
The undermining of traditional mechanisms of parliamentary oversight by
successive governments has culminated in a period of tumultuous change in recent
Irish political life. However, the response has been to create a network of regulatory
and oversight mechanisms, the remit of which remains unclear for many. While the
institutions examined above as case-studies produce much information about political
and bureaucratic processes, it is open to debate as to whether there is more
‘accountability’ per se. Strengthening existing parliamentary mechanisms of
oversight rather than creating new extra-parliamentary ones has not been seriously
considered despite evidence to show that many of the issues before Tribunals of
Inquiry could have been addressed at an earlier stage within the Oireachtas.
By their very nature, legislatures are the most difficult institutions to reform
and fear of unintended consequences acts as a deterrent for any incumbent
government to engage seriously with the matter of parliamentary reform.
Nonetheless, as Papadopoulous points out, democracy is impoverished if new
networks of governance come to supplant democratic channels for effective decision-
making (Papdopoulos, 2003: 493). Despite its many failings, the system of
parliamentary accountability in Ireland is key to the functioning of the political and
administrative systems. New conceptions of accountable governance must not see the
legislature as peripheral to the decision-making process, but rather as an integral part
of it.27
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